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PARTIALLY DESACRALIZED SPACES: 
THE RELIGIOUS AVAILABILITY 
OF FOUCAULT'S THOUGHT 
Thomas R. Flynn 
To whom life is an experience to be carried as far as possible .... 
Georges Bataille 
Focusing on transgressive thinking and limit experience, I consider the pos-
sibility of formulating religious discourse in (and even on) Foucauldian 
terms. It is as philosopher of the event, of space, and of experience that 
Foucault holds most promise for fruitful dialogue with religious thought. 
After sketching a possible archaeology and genealogy of religious practice, 
I turn to Foucault's own experience in the Mohave Desert as an opening to 
the Other. Appeal to mystical experience on Foucauldian terms must resist 
the traditional quest for "shelter in which experience can rest." Rather, any 
Foucauldian self-transcendence will entail embracing a "non-unitary multi-
plicity" (B lanchot). 
Some avowedly atheistic philosophers cannot leave God alone. Sartre fits 
into this category. To be sure, he confessed in his autobiography, The Words, 
that his atheism was a "cruel and long-range affair," and he reported he finally 
"collared the Holy Ghost in the cellar and threw him out"l-a remark that 
lends Nietzsche's "death of God" pronouncement a particularly graphic twist. 
But, in fact, religious concepts and analogies continued to punctuate Sartre's 
writings to the very end. Indeed, his final interview with Benny Levy scan-
dalized Simone de Beauvoir in part because of its being "soft" on religious 
themes and theses. 2 Bertrand Russell appears to have been another such 
philosopher. He felt obliged to explain his atheism more than once, as if the 
questioner were none other than himself.3 
Yet there are others who seem to feel no need even to raise the question, 
much less to answer it in the negative. These may be "anonymous" believers, 
as some would have it, but they would be surprised by any move to convert 
them by a definition and would probably insist that the burden of proof rests 
with those who seek to make the discovery, if not to effect the transformation. 
Where does Michel Foucault fit into this spectrum of believing nonbelievers 
and non-believing believers? 
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Perhaps we should take a hint from the practice of "stipulative conversion" 
and examine the meaning of "religion." This looks promising at first blush. 
Even a naturalist like Dewey held "the religious" in high regard, so long as 
one kept organized "religion" at bay.4 The difficulty with seeking an analo-
gous notion in Foucault or any of the so-called "poststructuralists" is that 
Dewey's famous "sense of the whole" is precisely what they are intent on 
combatting. We operate in fragmented and fragmenting world(s), they insist, 
whose very limits are there to be transgressed. Still, the concept of limit might 
prove useful. To the extent that it is linked with the other and with the 
"othering" act of transgression, it may provide a key (but only one among 
possibly many) for unlocking the topic of religious discourse in Foucault's 
thought. 
Admittedly, the definition of "religion" like that of "art" is proverbially 
elusive. But perhaps we can settle on one commonly .accepted sense of the 
term that would serve to distinguish religious from ethical or aesthetic dis-
course as we search for some equivalent in the work of Foucault. That his 
thought, especially in its later stages, gave pride of place to aesthetic consid-
erations is by now a commonplace. That his was an "ethics for thought" is 
likewise well documented.s But is there any room for the properly "religious" 
(on the assumption that we can determine what that is) between Foucault's 
"aesthetics of existence" that makes of one's life a "work of art" in the 
Nietzschean mode, and his "ethos of the intellectual" in our day, which is to 
"take distance on oneself' (se deprendre de soi-meme)?6 If "to think" is to 
"other" in the sense of crossing to the other side of a limit or boundary-the 
"thought from outside" (pellsee du dehors) that so fascinated Foucault-could 
it be that the space for "religious" discourse is on the other side? that it 
perhaps is that outside? Two authors whom Foucault highly respects who 
have written on religion, namely, Georges Bataille and Georges Dumezil, 
seem to support such a thesis. 7 The "wholly other" (totaWer aliter) of relig-
ious philosophers since Rudolf OUo might thereby gain admission or, better, 
recognition as a possibility worth examining in, and perhaps even on, Fou-
cauldian terms. Besides sketching a few lines toward a possible archaeology 
and a genealogy of religious discourse, it is chiefly this rather modest pro-
posal that I wish to defend. 8 
The Problematized Other 
In an interview concerning his last works, Foucault noted that his thought 
had come to focus on the "problematizing" of certain issues, specifically that 
of the moral self. How did it happen, he asked in genealogical fashion, that 
sexual conduct became "problematized" in the genesis of the moral self in 
Western thought? His strategy has always been to tell the story of the neces-
sities and the taken-for-granted of our received wisdom to uncover the di-
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mension of chance and possibility that characterizes our past and future 
respecti vely. So the fact that sexual behavior ranked on a par with or some-
what below diet and exercise in the ethical concerns of Athenian theorists in 
the fifth century BC opens the possibility that we too can think "otherwise 
than before" about the determining role that sexual orientation and behavior 
play in our contemporary view of moral identity and responsibility. 
Again and again, Foucault's project of "thinking otherwise" repeats itself 
in his works. It appears most regularly in his tendency to inverse the received 
causal relations in intellectual history. Thus the "great man" theory of his-
torical causality with its "tangled network of influences" is overturned by 
appeal to epistemic shifts such as the one entailing the dissociation of the 
sign and resemblance in the early seventeenth century. This "archaeological" 
shift caused a network of necessities to emerge, namely, probability, analysis, 
combination, and a universal language system, which in turn "made possible 
the individuals we term Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume or Condillac."9 Likewise, 
it is the emergence of a "disciplinary reason" in the early nineteenth-century, 
rendering it common-sensical to incarcerate criminals for whatever offense, 
that fostered the rise of the social sciences, not the inverse, as is commonly 
believed. to He reminds us that there is always the "other" of our received 
opinions, haunting them like the memory of a former resident, dispossessed 
and exiled in order that we might remain in pacific possession of the "same." 
His early "archaeology of the silence" to which the insane have been con-
demned since the Age of Reason, Madness and Civilization, was the first of 
many studies of the ever-present other. 
For in Foucault's scheme there is always an "other." It may be the "mur-
mur" of life or being that sounds through the grids of archaeology, the resis-
tances that locate each exercise of power in his genealogies, the spaces of 
inclusion/exclusion that pervade the "games of truth" in his retrospective 
reading of his own work. One has a sense of always being in medias res, 
without well defined beginning or absolute end. Even the epistemic "breaks" 
that he adopts from Bachelard mark gaps in two continuities. There is always 
a "before" and an "after," a "prior" and a "posterior," a "here" and a "there." 
If "religion" is taken to denote a relation (a "tying fast," religare) to the 
sacred, then Foucault's relation will not be to a metaphysical "god of the 
gaps" such as that favored by philosophers in early modernity. For these 
breaks are descriptive, not explanatory; they delineate formal, explanatory 
grids, but are themselves simply facts. To question their existence in the mode 
of traditional arguments from contingency, would presuppose another 
schema, with its initial gap, separating and uniting a before and an after, and 
so on. Of course, there is always the archimedean question, the self-referen-
tial challenge to which even the slipperiest relativist is liable: tu quoque, 
where do you stand? But that presumes a certain commitment to more than 
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limited discursive horizons-and it is just such a commitment that Foucault 
declines to make. In other words, it looks as if the standard "approaches to 
God" are dead ends on the Foucauldian highway. The bridge is out. 
The Event 
Foucault is a philosopher of the event. Obviously, his focus on "histories" 
suggests a profound interest in the historical event. But the term "event" is 
far more complex and all-pervasive than that of a mere public, temporal 
happening. And if the so-called "new" historians discount the traditional 
historian's emphasis on individual datable occurrences (what they dismiss as 
"battles and treaties"), Foucault's understanding of the term includes the 
probabilistic, the statistical, and the glacial (Braudel's La longue duree). Be-
cause of the centrality of the event to his thought, I wish to pursue it in some 
detail in order to consider its possible relevance for religious discourse. A 
priori, one expects that whatever "god" might fit into Foucault's categories 
will not be the God of the philosophers (e.g., the first or final principle of a 
metaphysical system) but will be more like that of Hebraism: the God of 
events, of the unrepeatable, of history. And it may be that a corresponding 
theological "positivism" will best meet the exigencies of this self-proclaimed 
"light-footed positivist." In other words, we may discover that the most one 
can do is wait (like HOiderlin and Heidegger) for a theophany of some kind, 
the upsurge or intervention of the "other" in some recognizably religious 
sense. 
In a poetic musing that recalls both the negative theologians and the mys-
tics, Foucault observes: 
Language, in its every word, is indeed directed at contents that preexist it; 
but in its own being, provided that it holds as close to its being as possible, 
it only unfolds in the pureness afthe wait. Waiting is directed at nothing: any 
object that could gratify it would only efface it. StilI, it is not confined to 
one place, it is not a resigned immobility; it has the endurance of a movement 
that will never end and would never promise itself the reward of rest; it does 
not wrap itself in interiority; all of it falls irremediably outside. Waiting 
cannot wait for itself at the end of its own past, nor rejoice in its own patience, 
nor steel itself once and for all, for it was never lacking in courage. What 
takes it up is not memory but forgetting. This forgetting ... is extreme atten-
tiveness.ll 
Our initial suspicion about what we may now call "attentive" waiting seeks 
confirmation in further consideration of Foucault's notion of "event." 
Foucault's major work is commonly divided into at least two periods, the 
archaeological and the genealogical. The former appears more "structural" in 
its search for "a method of analysis purged of anthropologism,"12 one that 
discounts a set of notions such as origin, tradition, influence, development, 
and evolution, dear to event-oriented historians. But his immediate interest 
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is in the "statement/event," as he calls it, and he questions, not the grammar 
of the statement, but "how it is that one particular statement appeared rather 
than another" (AK 27). His reason for speaking of the statement as event is 
"to restore the specificity of its occurrence, and to show that discontinuity is 
one of those great accidents that create cracks not only in the geology of 
history, but also in the simple fact of the statement." In opposition to struc-
tural linguistics, Foucault insists that "however badly deciphered we may 
suppose it to be, a statement is always an event that neither the language 
(langue) not the meaning can quite exhaust" (AK 28). We can see in this 
respect for the factical the root of his "positivism" a well as the antidote to 
whatever "structuralist" proclivities he might have manifested up to that 
point. In fact, in his most "structuralist" history, The Order of Things, he 
refers to structuralism as "the awakened and troubled consciousness of mod-
ern thought" (OT 208). 
Archaeology is not a form of mental geology. Much less is it the search for 
beginnings (archai). Rather, it is the description of the "archive," the histori-
cal a priori of a given period which conditions the practices of exclusion and 
inclusion that are ingredient in all social exchange: the true and the false, the 
normal and the deviant, the evident and the unthinkable, and so forth. Obvi-
ously, the sacred and the profane could be added to this list. An "archaeology" 
of religious discourse would describe the actual discursive and nondiscursive 
religious practices13 of an epoch in order to lay bare the grids of intelligibility 
that condition their exercise. 14 Using the modern "episteme" as an example, 
a Foucauldian analysis might focus on the inability of religious discourse in 
the nineteenth century to bring into viable unity the dualities of phenom-
ena/noumena, relative/absolute, for-us/in-itself, and the like, bequeathed us 
by the collapse of the "naming" paradigm in the Classical age. From an 
archaeological viewpoint, the controversies over form and context (Sitz im 
Leben), for example, that engaged Biblical critics in that period could be read 
as self-generating and symbiotic, once the Kantian break with the referent is 
effected. 
Of all the "events" the archaeologist describes, the most important and the 
rarest are what Foucault calls "transformations" and "ruptures," of which the 
most radical bear on the general rules of one or several discursive formations 
(AK 177). The famous epistemological "breaks" analyzed in The Order of 
Things are instances of such ruptures. But the point is that Foucault refers to 
these radical breaks as "events" even as he allows that "archaeology distin-
guishes several possible levels of events within the very density of discourse" 
(AK 117).15 
In the lecture inaugurating his Chair at the College de France, 2 December 
1970, Foucault distinguishes the critical from the genealogical "ensembles" 
of analysis that he proposes for his subsequent work. That same year, he 
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publishes a major essay in which he explains that his "genealogical method" 
is concerned, not with origin (Ursprung), which he links with Platonic essen-
tialism, but with the course of descent (Herkunft) of a series of events. 
Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map 
the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of 
descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to 
identify the accidents, the minute deviations-or conversely, the complete 
reversals-the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that 
gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is 
to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and 
what we are, but [in] the exteriority of accidents. 16 
As a logic of "difference," genealogy is an alternative to dialectic (the logic 
of the same). "What is found at the historical beginning of things," Foucault 
insists, "is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of 
other things. It is disparity" (NGH, 142, emphasis mine). 
Commenting on the work of Giles Deleuze, but expressing his own pref-
erence as well, Foucault asks: "What if thought freed itself from common 
sense and decided to function only in its extreme singularity? ... What if it 
conceived of difference differentially, instead of searching out the common 
elements underlying difference?" In response, he concludes: "Then difference 
would disappear as a general feature that leads to the generality of the con-
cept, and it would become-a different thought, the thought of difference-a 
pure event."17 These are the words of a historical nominalist, for whom the drive 
for multiplicity overrides the Hegelian and the Platonizing urge for unity. IS 
The constellation dispersion-event-chance hovers over Foucault's nominal-
istic genealogies just as relations of power pervade their every facet. By now 
it is well known that "power" denotes not only negative relations of domi-
nance and control but positive ones of creativity and reasoning. Not that 
Foucault has collapsed "truth" into "power," as Habermas and others have 
insisted. He explicitly denies this is SO.19 But power relations are always 
present in human exchanges, even in the most detached and cerebral commu-
nication. His point is that these events are subject to alternative descriptions 
along the axes of power or of knowledge. The last phase of his thought, which 
centers on modes of "subjectivation" and the constitution of the moral self, 
adds a third possible axis, namely, the line of self-constitution.20 So one can 
chart the advance of a particular topic along each of these lines. 
But along the genealogical axis, the events multiply without end. Describ-
ing Nietzsche's "effective history" (wirkliche Historie) in terms that antici-
pate his later remarks about "eventization," Foucault argues: "An event 
consequently is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal 
of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a 
vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination 
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that poisons itself as it grows lax. The forces operating in history ... always 
appear through the singular randomness of events" (IP 154-55, my emphasis). 
As I noted elsewhere, this last sentence could well serve as the motto for 
Foucault's genealogical historiography: to search for the "forces of domina-
tion" operating in history by a painstaking and inventive analysis of innu-
merable heterogeneous events. 21 
Genealogy of Religious Practice 
Nietzschean genealogy, the inspiration and model for Foucault's enterprise, 
has long been applied to religious beliefs and institutions. In its attempt to 
lay bare the descent (Herkunft) ofreligious practice, genealogy in Nietzsche's 
hands continues the tradition of Lucretius et al. in locating the genesis and 
motor of religion in fear of the unknown. But Nietzsche adds the psychologi-
cal dimension of ressentiment and the metaphysics of will-to-power to his 
account. In parity with his other genealogies, a genealogy of religious prac-
tices and institutions, were Foucault to have undertaken one, would have 
revealed the relations of power/resistance that lay behind the lofty principles 
and doctrines of the world's major religions (genealogy as critique). Perhaps 
the founders of these religions, some at least, would have ranked with Freud 
and Marx as "initiators of discursive practices," though Foucault claims that 
these two were "the first and most important." The distinctive contribution 
of these authors, Foucault explains, "is that they produced not only their own 
work, but the possibility and the rules of formation of other texts."22 It is 
crucial that they actually wrote or said what was attributed to them. In this 
they differ from originators of literary texts or makers of scientific discover-
ies. Moreover, whereas the founding act of a scientific program "is on an 
equal footing with its future transformations, ... the initiator of a discursive 
practice is heterogeneous to its ulterior transformations." In fact, the initiator 
of a discursive practice, unlike the founder of a science, overshadows and is 
necessarily detached from its later developments and transformations" (WA 
133-134). Moreover, subsequent practitioners of such discourses must "return 
to the origin," namely, to a "text in itself." As he explains, "a study of 
Galileo's works could alter our knowledge of the history, but not the science, 
of mechanics; whereas, a reexamination of the books of Freud or Marx can 
transform our understanding of Psychoanalysis or Marxism" (WA 135-36). It 
seems that something similar could be said of the Bible or the Koran, for 
example, to the extent that Judaism, Islam and Christianity are religions of 
the book and that book is attributed to a specific author. 
The Sacred as Heterotopia 
Foucault is also a philosopher of space. In fact, what I have elsewhere called 
his "spatialization of reason" is both a positive alternative to dialectical 
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totalization and the mark of his postmodernity.23 Spatial metaphors abound 
in his writings. But the concepts of spatial division, exclusion, and inclusion 
are more than rhetorical devices. They enter into the very fiber of the argu-
ment itself. This is true of his tables, triangles and quadrilaterals (in The 
Order of Things, in particular), but comes most strikingly to the fore in his 
use of Bentham's Panopticon. There the model is integral to the reasoning 
process, just as the artifact is essential to an aesthetic "argument" that con-
tinually refers to it in its singularity and not as a mere instance. In the case 
of the Panopticon, one is being led by the strategic lines of physical possi-
bility, in this case, visibility, to understand the architectural embodiment of 
surveillance and control: carceral reason in three dimensions. 
In a conference, "Of Other Spaces," delivered the year after The Order of 
Things was published, Foucault laments: 
Despite all the techniques for appropriating space, despite the whole network 
of knowledge (sa voir) that enables us to delimit or to formalize it, contem-
porary space is still not completely desacralized (unlike time, no doubt, which 
was detached from the sacred in the nineteenth century)., 
He admits that a certain theoretical desacralization has taken place since 
Galileo, but insists that "we may still not have reached the point of a practical 
de sacralization of space."24 
He then distinguishes a category of external spaces or sites "that have the 
curious property of being in relation with all other sites, but in such a way 
as to suspect, neutralize, or invent the set of relations that they happen to 
designate, mirror, or reflect." They are linked with all the other sites by the 
fact that they contradict them. There are two subspecies of such contradictive 
sites, utopias and heterotopias (no-places and other-places respectively). As 
we might expect, Foucault proceeds to focus on other-places, suggesting the 
initial principles of "a sort of systematic description" of these sites, which, 
in imitation of Bataille, he calls "heterotopology" (OS 24). 
Unlike utopias, heterotopias are real places, "something like counter-sites" 
in the midst of our societies that function "as a sort of simultaneously mythic 
and real contestation of the space in which we live" (OS 24). Foucault sys-
tematically describes the various forms and functions of these sites, from 
libraries and museums, barracks and prisons, rest homes and cemeteries, to 
cinemas and gardens, fairgrounds and ships, the heterotopia par excellence.25 
These counter-sites combine the "othering" character of Foucauldian "transgres-
sive thinking" with the spatializing nature of his argument. But since they ques-
tion "all the other sites," heterotopias are more "totalizing" than Foucault seems 
willing to acknowledge. And since they admix the mythic and the real in this 
contestant function, they are apt locales for the "totally other" to be revealed in 
the spatial contestation of our received modes of living and dealing with each 
other. One such "incompletely desacralized" space is the desert. 
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The Desert Experience 
"Going into the desert" has long been synonymous with physical and spiritual 
removal from the world, its affairs and cares. The desert is the place of 
theophanies (Moses at Horeb), of spiritual struggle and renewal (Jesus fasting 
in the desert), of self-discovery and preparation for mission (Paul after his 
experience on the road to Damascus). The desert, like the mountain, is the 
paradigmatic "place apart."26 
Whatever one might think of James Miller's recent biography of Foucault, 
there is no doubt that it addresses an important problem in the philosopher's 
life, namely, the change in style and content that marked the last two volumes 
of his History of Sexuality after his visits to California in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Miller's case for the close union between Foucault's life and work 
gives new force to the Foucauldian/Nietzschean injunction to "make of your life 
a work of art." Pivotal to this aesthetico-moral construction was Foucault's 
own "desert" experience: 
Night had fallen on Death Valley. Next to a car parked in the lot at Zabriskie 
Point, a portable tape recorder was playing a piece of electronic music, 
Karlheinz Stockhausen's Kontakte. Near the recorder sat Michel Foucault, 
alongside two young Americans .... As synthetic blips and bleeps filled thc 
cool desert air, the three men stared silently into space. Two hours before, 
all three had taken LSD. 
Foucault was about to enjoy what he would later call the greatest experience 
of his lifc-an epiphany that climaxed a series of similarly intense "limit-ex-
periences" in the gay community of San Francisco. As a result of thesc 
experiences, Foucault's thought would take a dramatic new turn, transform-
ing, in paradoxical and surprising ways, his continuing effort to illuminate 
what Nietzsche had called "the riddle which man must solve"-the riddle of 
his own singular being.27 
The desert is a place of extremes, of scorching heat and bitter cold, of 
parched earth and flash flooding, a site without compromise, wrapped in an 
immense silence and girded by vast, empty horizons-the void of limitless 
space, now refracted in the broken mirror of an acid-driven mind. If people 
for millennia have fled to the external spaces of the desert to free themselves 
from the distractions of society for whatever revelations awaited them, con-
temporary space travelers have explored inner space by means of mind-altering 
drugs in the hope of solving the riddle of existence. "Contemporary space 
is ... not completely desacralized." 
We can only conjecture what Foucault experienced as he gazed into the 
vast desert sky that May night. Was it akin to what Kant called the "sublime"? 
In its riveting of his attention for hours, did it in any way resemble that 
mysterium tremendum atque fascinans, the "wholly other" that Rudolf OUo 
finds as the core experience of the holy? "Contemporary space is perhaps 
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still not completely desacralized." It is most unlikely that he saw it only as 
an experience for its own sake, as mere entertainment, a divertissement to 
punctuate his visit to Southern California. He seems to have set aside the 
"light-footed" positivism that, in response to a hand pointing toward the sky, 
would have looked only at the tip of the finger. As Miller notes, these were 
limit-experiences that Foucault was after. And, although its immediate inspi-
ration is doubtless Bataille, the term is an echo of Jaspers' famous "limit 
situations" and carries a distinctly onto-theological connotation. And what of 
the limit-experience, the one that, as Miller argues, haunted Foucault all his 
life? What of death? This "cipher," this "footstep of God" (in Jaspers' termi-
nology) was certainly ingredient in Foucault's epiphanies at the sado-maso-
chistic clubs and bathhouses of San Francisco that surrounded this dessert 
experience. Did he recognize it as such? 
He had long acknowledged the close relation between the "death of God" 
and sexuality. As early as 1963, he wrote: "Undoubtedly it is excess that 
discovers that sexuality and the death of God are bound to the same experi-
ence .... And from this perspective the thought that relates to God and the 
thought that relates to sexuality are linked in a common form [as in Sade and 
BataiIle]."28 But the "death of God," once one removes its carapace of mere 
reportage, is arguably a religious experience, akin to the experience of the 
"absence of God" as distinct from the "absence of the experience of God."29 
Was not this linkage, sex/death/death-of-God, central to Foucault's limit-ex-
periences in California? 
Even to raise these questions, much less to attempt to answer them, runs 
the risk of "conversion by definition" that we held under suspicion at the 
outset. And yet this philosopher of the event and of space, was also, especially 
in his "post-desert" writings, a philosopher of experience. 3o He could scarcely 
have missed the awesome encounter with his own potential nothingness that 
intimates the unqualified Other as such. This is not ad hoc reasoning or 
baseless conjecture. It simply echoes the testimony that captivated Bergson 
and so many others: the counter-discourse of negative theologians and mys-
tics through the ages. 
The Mystical 
Foucault was not unaware of the "temptation." In his brilliant essay on 
Maurice Blanchot, "The Thought from Outside," he raises the issue only to 
dismiss it. But the point is that he senses it is there to be raised. 
Despite several confluences, we are quite far from the experience through 
which some are wont to lose themselves in order to find themselves. The 
characteristic movement of mysticism is to attempt to join-even if it means 
crossing the night-the positivity of an existence by opening a difficult line 
of communication with it. Even when that existence contests itself, hollows 
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itself out in the labor of its own negativity, infinitely withdrawing into a 
lightless day, a shadow less night, a visibility devoid of shape, it is still a 
shelter in which experience can rest. The shelter is created as much by the 
law of a Word as by the open expanse of silence. For in the form of the 
experience, silence is the immeasurable, inaudible, primal breath from which 
all manifest discourse issues; or, speech is a reign with the power to hold 
itself in silent suspense. 
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Turning away from this obviously alluring vision, he adds curtly: "The ex-
perience of the outside has nothing to do with that" (FB 53-54). 
Does he protest too much? Was not his California pilgrimage motivated in 
part by the desire to solve the riddle of his singular being? Were not his 
life-threatening encounters in the city and the initial risk of LSD in the desert 
precisely ways to "lose oneself in order to find oneself'? No doubt, that "self' 
was more site than substance or subject. As Blanchot observed, it was a 
"non-unitary multiplicity," something like a phrase in serial music. 31 
James Miller cites the following summary of his book by an unsympathetic 
critic: 
The ultimate question which Foucault's life poses to Miller is whether various 
forms of radical politics, radical sex, and other kinds of supposed 'limit-ex-
perience' actual1y offer the modern subject a real means of self-transcen-
dence. 
To which Miller adds, "Precisely." His reason for not answering that question, 
as the critic challenges him to do, was that he "wanted to compose a text that 
would open the question up-and allow different kinds of readers to respond 
in different kinds of ways."32 A typically Foucauldian practice. 
Diremption as Redemption: The Divine Absence 
Foucault, who once insisted that there has not been an original secular ethics 
in the West since the Stoics, exhibited something nco-Stoic, even Camus ian, 
in his own courageous mixture of life and work, his writing in the face of 
imminent death, as if to delay the inevitable by coopting it in the text. His 
"ethics for thought" resembles a kind of self-transcendence. It is a self-dis-
tancing (se deprendre de soi-meme) that is simultaneously a self-constitution: 
the self as other. This ethics resists idolatry of all kinds, even the idolizing 
of one's previously published works. The image of Camusian "secular sanc-
tity" (Can one be a- saint without God?) comes to mind in this context and 
suggests an analogous one of secular mysticism (Can one lose oneself in the 
void in order to find oneself?). But this mysticism neither asks nor receives 
the consolation and comfort of "a shelter in which experience can rest." 
Rather, it embraces the whirlwind of one's "nonunifying multiplicity," inten-
sified by natural or artificial means. 
The antithesis of "attenti ve waiting" referred to earlier? On the contrary, it 
might well be a parody of the via purgativa, little more than a preparing for 
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the "event" that never occurred. Or did it? Could it be that it was happening 
unnoticed? Could the seemingly fruitless, even frenzied, repetition be that 
very multiplicity through which the Other invades and dissolves one's unity 
to the point of final disappearance (disparition)? 
This may strike many as meager rations for souls "athirst for the living 
God." Could one not have achieved the same effect by wiring into a "virtual 
reality" mechanism? Perhaps. As the dying cleric assures us at the end of The 
Diary of a Country Priest, "Grace is everywhere."33 
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